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STATEMENT OF THE CASF
Nature Of The Case
Wayne Simpson appeals from

judgment of

forcible

sexual penetration.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Simpson confessed to physically and sexually abusing a two-year-old
child living in the home where he was staying. (PSI, pp. 4-5; R., pp. 12-13, 1516, 20-23, 27-28, 30-33.)

The state charged him with injury to a child and

forcible sexual penetration. (Augmentation.)
Simpson filed a motion to suppress (R., pp. 84-90), which the state
opposed (R., pp. 94-100). After a hearing (4/16/14 Tr.), the district court denied
the motion (R., pp. 111-18). The district court found the facts as follows:
Based on trauma to a child's body that was discovered by hospital
personnel, law enforcement concluded that the child had been
sexually abused sometime between February 18, 2013, and
February 23, 2013. In the months between February, 2013 and
June 28, 2013, law enforcement contacted Defendant and
questioned him about the abuse multiple times. During each
interview, Defendant denied any culpability.
On June 28, 2013, Officer Jessica Marely [sic] ("Officer Marley")
contacted Defendant at his home. She told Defendant that
Detective Lawrence of the Idaho Falls Police Department wanted to
speak with him about the abuse at the Law Enforcement Building.
While at his home, Defendant asked Officer Marley if he was going
to be arrested. Officer Marley replied that law enforcement had
some questions and that Defendant would not be arrested that day.
Officer Marley then transported Defendant to the Law Enforcement
Building.
Prior to becoming a police officer, Officer Marley worked as an
investigator for the Department of Health and Welfare, where she
investigated child abuse cases for Child Protective Services. In her
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work as a child welfare investigator, Officer Marley investigated
sexual abuse in Defendant's family. Officer Marley testified that she
had significant contact with Defendant over the years and had
knowledge of sexual abuse in Defendant's family. During the June
28, 2013, interview, Defendant was twenty-nine-years-old.
However, at the time of Officer Marely's initial contact with
Defendant, he was approximately twelve-years-old. Officer Marley
also testified that she had personally contacted Defendant in a law
enforcement capacity on multiple unrelated occasions.
When Officer Marley and Defendant arrived at the Law
Enforcement Building, Detective Lawrence took Defendant to a
small, windowless room ("interrogation room") for questioning.
Before beginning the questioning, Detective Lawrence informed
Defendant that he was not under arrest, would not be arrested, and
was free to leave. Defendant's response was inaudible, but
Detective Lawrence responded to Defendant with "Okay." The
officers testified that they never read Defendant his Miranda rights,
Defendant did not appear confused and tracked the conversation
throughout the interrogation, and that Defendant was never told he
could not leave.
Detective Lawrence then began questioning Defendant about his
involvement with the child's injuries. Defendant offered an
explanations [sic] for the child's injuries, but did not admit
culpability. After several minutes of questioning, Officer Marley took
over the questioning. Officer Marley told Defendant that she had
been involved with the investigation of his family several years ago
and that she placed Defendant in foster care. She told Defendant
that she knew his family's bad circumstances. Defendant said that
he had forgotten, but that the case involved his little sister and
niece. Officer Marley mentioned that she knew bad things
happened to Defendant personally. Defendant responded that he
knew that people in his family had been raped. Throughout this
portion of the questioning, Officer Marley consistently referenced
Defendant's history of abuse.
After several minutes of questioning, all parties took a brief break
from the questioning. During the break, Officer Marley
accompanied Defendant outside so he could smoke a cigarette.
After the break, Detective Lawrence aggressively questioned
Defendant. The questioning used the techniques of isolation,
statements that law enforcement knew of Defendant's guilt,
minimization, and references to the embarrassment of a trial.
Officer Marley also used her particularized knowledge of
Defendant's past by vaguely referencing the bad things that
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happened in Defendant's family. Defendant initially denied
culpability, but his explanations were inconsistent. Defendant
denied any involvement, but then admitting [sic] to penetrating the
child's anus with his fingers. Because of the high level of trauma to
the child, Officer Marley did not believe Defendant used his fingers.
An hour to an hour and a half after the interview initially began,
Defendant admitted to using a vibrator to penetrate the child's
anus.
(R., pp. 111-13.)

Applying the relevant legal standards, the district court

concluded that although there were elements of coercion (as there are in every
police interrogation), such was not sufficient to overcome Simpson's will. (R., pp.
113-17.)
After the district court denied Simpson's motion to suppress, Simpson pied
guilty to forcible sexual penetration, preserving his right to appeal the denial of
his suppression motion, and the state dismissed the other count. (R., pp. 12025.) The district court subsequently imposed a sentence of 25 years with eight
years determinate.

(R., pp. 137-42.) Simpson filed a notice of appeal timely

from entry of judgment. (R. p. 149.)
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ISSUE
Simpson states the issue on appeal as:
Whether
district court erred in denying Mr. Simpson's motion to
suppress the coerced-compliant statement the officers extracted
from him after overbearing his will.
(Appellant's brief, p. 11.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Simpson failed to show clear error in the district court's factual
findings or error in its application of the law to the facts it found?
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ARGUMENT
Simpson Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual Findings
Or Error In Its Application Of The Law To The Facts It Found
Introduction
The district court applied the correct legal standard to the facts
and concluded that Simpson's confession was not coerced.

case

(R., pp. 111-18.)

Simpson asserts the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings, which
ultimately led to an erroneous determination that his confession was not coerced.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-35.)

For example, Simpson claims the district court

erred factually "because it misconstrued Dr. Lindsey's testimony and his
evaluation, and thus, the nature of Mr. Simpson's mental health issues" and
"refused to consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was not informed" of his Miranda
rights.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-21.)

Review shows that the district court's

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, and thus Simpson's claim
of clear error fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review, the appellate court gives "deference to the lower court's

findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages in "free review
over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show
voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App.
1995).

The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal question freely

reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
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The District Court's Factual Findings Are Supported By The Evidence
use in a state criminal trial of a defendant's confession obtained by
physical
Amendment."

or

,..,.,,,, ... +,,,

forbidden

the

Fourteenth

Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561

obtained after holding defendant incommunicado for three days and then telling
him that a lynch mob was on its way was coerced).

The test is "whether a

defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
confession," considering "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both
the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation."
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (internal quotes omitted).
This test, however, "is not concerned with moral and psychological
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion."
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985). Thus, "coercive police activity is
a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). '"Indeed, far from being prohibited by the
Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently
desirable....

Absent

some

officially

coerced

self-accusation,

the

Fifth

Amendment privilege is not violated by even the most damning admissions.'"
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187
(1977)).
Examples of mentally coercive police action that have overborne the will of
a suspect include threats of retaliation for not cooperating, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
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U.S. 528, 534 (1963) (threats to take children from mother and to deny state
welfare benefits unless she cooperated were coercive), and certain promises in
the confession, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991)
(promise by government agent to protect inmate from fellow

if

confessed coerced confession). Police conduct designed to elicit incriminating
statements that does not amount to coercion includes misrepresentations about
the evidence against the defendant, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (false
representation that co-defendant had confessed and implicated defendant
"insufficient" to render confession inadmissible), "[pJloys to mislead a suspect or
lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or
coercion to speak," Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990), and general
statements that cooperation with the police will be to the suspect's advantage,
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979). In sum: "Trickery, deceit, even
impersonation do not render a confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial
situations and usually in custodial ones as well, unless the government makes
threats or promises." United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9 th Cir.
2004) (en bane) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
The district court applied the totality of the circumstances test, looking
specifically at the facts that officers did not provide Miranda warnings; officers
were not legally required to give Miranda warnings; the interview was noncustodial and officers told Simpson he was free to leave; Simpson was 29 years
old; "Dr. Lindsey testified that Defendant may suffer from a mild to moderate form
of executive function disorder" but also testified that "he never tested Defendant";
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Simpson was "tracking and aware" during the interview; questioning lasted "less
an hour and a half' before Simpson confessed; Simpson was not deprived
necessities

as

, water or sleep; Simpson was given a smoking break

during the interview; Simpson was not arrested.

, pp. 11

court reasoned that although the police used interview techniques that were
"somewhat coercive," all police interviews and "virtually any contact with law
enforcement" is inherently coercive, and such alone does not render confessions
involuntary.

(R., pp. 116-17.)

Because the district court properly applied the

totality of the circumstances test to the facts, it properly found that Simpson's
statements were not compelled.
In attacking the district court's analysis,
misstatements of the law and the facts.

Simpson makes several

For example, he claims that the

"Supreme Court's concerns with police coercion in custodial interrogations are
equally applicable in the noncustodial interview." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.)
This claim cannot be squared with the repeated statements by the Supreme
Court of the United States that custodial interrogation carries such "inherently
compelling pressures" that that Court has "adopted a set of prophylactic
measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against selfincrimination."

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, _

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401

(2011) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Indeed, the "premise of
Miranda" is that the "danger of coercion" arising from "the interaction of custody

and official interrogation" requires warnings and a waiver of rights, but Miranda is
not concerned with "(p]loys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of
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security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion."

Illinois v.

Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990). The district court's reasoning, as opposed to
appellate argument, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis that "[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a
have coercive aspects to it," but custody equivalent to arrest creates a more
coercive environment that must be countered by informing the suspect of his
rights. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,495 (1977).
Another misstatement comes when Simpson claims that the "district court
did not consider Mr. Simpson's mental health issues in its analysis of this issue
because it believed the officers' testimony that Mr. Simpson appeared to be
tracking their questions during the interview." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) Here is
the district court's analysis of Simpson's mental health issues and whether he
was tracking the questions he was being asked:
During this contact, Defendant was never read his Miranda rights.
While this Court understands that this could be a negative factor,
Miranda did not apply because this was not a custodial
interrogation. The evidence was clear that Defendant agreed to a
voluntary interview and was free to leave at any time. Defendant
was also twenty-nine-years-old at the time of the interview. While
Dr. Lindsey testified that Defendant may suffer from a mild to
moderate form of executive function disorder, Dr. Lindsey testified
that he never tested Defendant. Both officers also testified that
Defendant appeared to be tracking and aware during the interview.
Before confessing, Defendant was questioned for less than an hour
and a half. Defendant was never deprived of any physical
necessities, such as food, water or sleep. Instead, the officers gave
Defendant a break partway through the interrogation. While the
officers questioned Defendant multiple times prior to this encounter,
he had never been arrested for this crime and was informed that he
was free to leave. When viewed together, these factors do not
convince this Court that Defendant's confession was involuntary.
(R., p. 116.)
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Lindsey testified that Defendant experienced difficulty tracking
conversations, but both officers testified that Defendant was abie to
track during the interrogation. After reviewing the video, this Court
believes the officers' testimony that Defendant was able to track
during the interrogation. Based on this evidence, this Court believes
that the nature of questioning
impermissibly confuse, trick,
or deceive Defendant.
(R., p. 117.) The district court's stated analysis shows that it did consider Dr.
Lindsey's testimony about Simpson's mental health issues, but ultimately
rejected the argument that police exploited those issues to overbear his will and
coerce a statement. That the district court reached a different conclusion than
desired by Simpson, based on conflicting evidence, does not show that the court
ignored the evidence.

Simpson's reading of the record is misleading and

inaccurate.
A third misstatement is Simpson's claim that the "district court refused to
consider the factor that Mr. Simpson was not informed of his right to remain silent
and his right to have an attorney present as discussed in Miranda based on its
conclusion that Miranda was irrelevant in this case as it was not a custodial
interrogation." (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) The district court's analysis of this factor
was as follows:
During this contact Defendant was never read his Miranda rights.
While this Court understands that this could be a negative factor,
Miranda did not apply because this was not a custodial
interrogation. The evidence was clear that Defendant agreed to a
voluntary interview and was free to leave at any time.
(R., p. 116.) The district court thus considered the fact that Miranda warnings
were not given, but found this was significantly mitigated by the fact that this was
a non-custodial interrogation, and therefore (as stated above) did not carry the
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inherent coerciveness that Miranda was designed to ameliorate.

Simpson's

claim the district court "refused to consider" the absence of Miranda warnings in
totality

the circumstances or thought it was "irrelevant" is contrary to the

district court's stated analysis.
To make his legal argument Simpson relies heavily on the analysis in
State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1999). (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-16,
23-24, 32.) Although there are some factors in that case similar to this one, there
are many more that are dissimilar, as shown in the following chart:
Rettenberger (citations to pages in 984
P.2d)

Simpson (citations to pages in record)

18 years old (p. 1011)
Was told several times was facing the
death penalty and that lesser charges
might result from cooperation (p. 101213, 1017-18)
Refused
requested
contacts with
mother (p. 1012)
Lied "numerous times concerning the
existence, nature, and strength of
evidence they had collected against
him" (pp. 1012, 1015)

29 years old (p. 116)
Was not threatened with the death
penalty.

No

record of requests to contact
others.
No finding that officers lied about
evidence (p. 113 (finding "techniques of
that
law
isolation,
statements
enforcement knew of Defendant's guilt,
minimization, and references to the
embarrassment of a trial")
Not provided Miranda warnings (p.
116)

Provided
Miranda
warnings,
but
comments about being represented
'ignored (p. 1011)
In jail and kept in solitary confinement Not in jail and told he could leave (R.,
without a pillow or blanket (pp. 1011, p. 113)
1018)
Interviewed twice in two days, over Interviewed several times over period
hours, while in custody (pp. 1011-12)
of months, relevant interview about an
hour to an hour and one-half in length

(p.113)
Provided a break to smoke (p. 113)

Denied bathroom breaks (p. 1012)
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I Diagnosed with A.D.D., below average Evaluated with, but not tested for, "mild

!I

,

maturity of 15-year-old, and
of depression, anxiety
disorder,
thought
disorder,
schizophrenia,
and
Dependent
Personality Disorder" (p. 1012)
Extensive use of "false friend"
technique, to point Rettenberger stated
his belief that police were "trying to
help" him (pp. 1016-17)

I "symptoms

to moderate executive dysfunction,"
"lack of sophisticated thinking," and
processing information "slowly" (p. 113)

Limited, if any, use of "false friend"
technique (p. 117 (finding Officer
Marley's references to when she was a
Health and Welfare worker on
Simpson's case years before "not
detailed" and "confined to vague
references of abuse")

Because of its egregious facts, the Rettenberger case is often distinguished.
See, §UL, State v. Bunting, 51 P.3d 37 (Utah App., 2002) (misrepresentations of
evidence, use of "false friend" technique, and other interrogations tactics did not
rise to the level employed in Rettenberger). Although there are a few passing
factual similarities, Rettenberger ultimately provides very limited, if any, support
for Simpson's argument because of its many factual differences.
Finally, rather than rely on the factual findings made by the district court,
Simpson invites this Court to apply the law to the conclusions of his experts.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19 (applying legal analysis to testimony of Dr. Lindsey1),
pp. 21-34 (applying legal analysis to conclusions of Dr. Honts).)

Whether to

accept the conclusions of experts, and what weight to give them, are matters of
discretion by the trial court, reversible only if the district court acted arbitrarily.

Simpson also requests this Court to consider the PSE and PSI. (Appellant's
brief, p. 17.) Because neither the PSI nor PSE were presented in support of the
motion to suppress, they cannot be considered in relation to this issue. See
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007) (appellate
review limited to evidence presented).
1
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Christensen v. Nelson, 125 Idaho 663, 666, 873 P.2d 917, 920 (Ct. App. 1994).
also Sheridan v. Jambura, 135 Idaho 787, 790, 25 P.3d 100, 103 (2001).
district

acknowledged the testimony of the defense experts, including

noting that Dr. Lindsey "was emphatic that his diagnosis was clinical and
based on testing" and that Dr. Honts overwhelmingly testified for criminal
defendants.

(R., pp. 1113-14.)

Despite this testimony, the district court

concluded the police did not "impermissibly confuse, trick, or deceive" Simpson,
and that the evidence overall showed that the confession was voluntary. (R., p.
117.)
The district court's findings of fact are based on the evidence. Its analysis
utilizes the correct legal standards. Simpson's arguments frequently misstate the
district court's analysis or law, or seek to improperly substitute the district court's
findings with his experts' analysis. Simpson has therefore failed to show error in
the district court's order denying his suppression motion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the lower court's
judgment.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2015.
~\
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